Philadelphia 76ers are being outplayed and outmaneuvered

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS - DECEMBER 12: Enes Kanter #11 of the Boston Celtics fouls Joel Embiid #21 of the Philadelphia 76ers at TD Garden on December 12, 2019 in Boston, Massachusetts. The 76ers defeat the Celtics 115-109. NOTE TO USER: User expressly acknowledges and agrees that, by downloading and or using this photograph, User is consenting to the terms and conditions of the Getty Images License Agreement. (Photo by Maddie Meyer/Getty Images)
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS - DECEMBER 12: Enes Kanter #11 of the Boston Celtics fouls Joel Embiid #21 of the Philadelphia 76ers at TD Garden on December 12, 2019 in Boston, Massachusetts. The 76ers defeat the Celtics 115-109. NOTE TO USER: User expressly acknowledges and agrees that, by downloading and or using this photograph, User is consenting to the terms and conditions of the Getty Images License Agreement. (Photo by Maddie Meyer/Getty Images)

The Philadelphia 76ers are being outplayed, outmaneuvered 

Though the Philadelphia 76ers entered their postseason matchup with the Boston Celtics as heavy underdogs, there remained hope among some observers that the loss of Ben Simmons would finally allow the Sixers to simplify their offensive system.

No longer forced to deal with the spacing issues that have long bedeviled the organization, coach Brett Brown could finally utilize the inside-out game that seemed a natural complement to Joel Embiid’s skillset.

While the loss of Simmons would be felt on the defensive end – where the Sixers would have to contend with Jayson Tatum – the belief, so the thinking went, was that Philadelphia could bridge the difference with improved offensive efficiency; turning the series into a high-scoring affair, and giving the 76ers’ a punchers chance at stealing it from Boston.

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Two games in, things haven’t quite gone according to plan for the Sixers.

Having lost both games by a combined 35 points, Philadelphia has found themselves stymied on both ends of the court, not only as a result of a lack of execution but because the strategic decisions by Brown have largely fallen flat.

Consider Philly’s decision to counter the high pick-and-roll attack employed by Boston thus far. Utilized 46 times by the Celtics in Game 1 alone – according to Synergy Sports – the Sixers have opted to drop Embiid to the rim, relying on their wing-defenders to get over the pick, in an attempt to force the ball-handler towards the mid-range and an open-shot.

While unorthodox, the strategy isn’t without merit, as Brown is clearly trying to bait Boston towards the path of least resistance by serving up the middle of the floor on a platter – an area that analytics generally holds to be one of the least efficient areas of the court, thanks to the difficulty of the range, and the reward only being two points.

In one particular sequence with two minutes gone in the first quarter in Game 2, the plan works out well for Philly, as a Smart-Theis pick-and-roll results in Smart being chased off the 3-point line by Tobias Harris coming over the pick, and being driven towards the outstretched arms of Embiid at the rim – ultimately forced to settle for a fall-away jumper just outside the lane.

The problem for the 76ers is that Boston and coach Brad Stevens rarely allow their opponents to run through a game according to plan.

Take, for example, Boston’s adjustment a few plays later. Initiating a Tatum-Theis P&R two-feet higher towards the logo, the Celtics elongate the court, not only preventing Philly from chasing them from the 3-point line as easily, but also create room for Tatum to get downhill, gaining a head of steam to blow by a waiting Embiid. It can’t go unmentioned, however, that much of this action is so effective for Boston because of the presence of Daniel Theis.

Quickly becoming one of the best off-ball players in the league, Theis’ ability to set hard screens and seals is the cog that makes the Celtics’ offense go; combining top-tier talent with a well-executed plan that makes them deadly and efficient.

Similarly, on the offensive end, the Sixers have placed a heavy emphasis on the positioning of Embiid near the low block. Not surprising given their centers’ decided height and size advantage over Boston’s bigs, what has been unexpected is Philadelphia’s continued preference for playing Horford and Embiid together, with the former occupying the dunker spot that Simmons often took.

Most often viewed as the reason the Philly offense has at times become so stilted – with a lack of shooting around the perimeter clogging the lane – Brown seems to believe pressing the Sixers’ size advantage on the boards is their best hope for victory against Boston, reiterating this philosophy in his post-game comments following Game 1.

While again, an understandable point in the abstract, Brown’s strategy has run-up against reality in the series thus far, with Boston gaining five more offensive rebounds than Philly in the first two games.

To make matters worse, Stevens has added increased pressure to the staggering Sixers’ offense, sending traps to the post and daring the remaining shooters on the court to try and beat them – that is, if Embiid and Horford are even able to find the daylight possible to get the ball out amidst the Celtics’ long-arms.

Additionally, Boston has also begun picking-up Embiid just as he enters the lane, forcing the seven-footer to receive the entry-pass near the free-throw line, and attack off the dribble to gain position. Even when Philly has attempted their own pick-and-roll attack, hoping to use Embiid’s brute strength as the roll man, the Celtics have done a superb job of bumping and tagging the Sixers as they come off screens, utilizing the half-second of time they need to get back on course, to jump back and close the passing-lane. A masterclass in killing your opponents by a thousand paper-cuts.

Though Brown is deserving of much of the criticism that is sure to come his way – and quite a bit of it has already started – there is another angle to consider, that may have forced the coach’s hand entering the series: the conditioning and drive of Joel Embiid.

The decision to drop in pick-and-roll defense may be designed to force the Celtics into mid-range shots, but it does also serve to spare Embiid from the demands of switching onto Boston’s speedier wings for four-quarters. Playing Horford in the dunker spot may crowd  Philadelphia’s passing-lanes, but it does save Embiid from being the only rebounding option on the floor. Operating in the low-block does take advantage of Philly’s size, but it also avoids Embiid having to operate off the dribble, as he has often proven adept at doing.

Indeed, late in the 4th-quarter of Game 1, Embiid could be seen bent over, hands on his knees in-between plays, as his touches diminished as the clock wore on. Perhaps even more concerning was that he was often pushed aside by Boston’s interior play, as the Celtics closed the rebounding gap; a shocking development that would prove terminal to the Sixers’ chances should it continue.

Long discussed as a potential concern, Embiid’s conditioning threatens not only Philadelphia’s chances in the bubble but his ability to turn into the top-5 player most assume is necessary to contend for a title.

After two games, Brett Brown and Joel Embiid’s futures are looking a lot less certain, while the Celtics look primed for an NBA Finals run.